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A recent article (Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014) reports data suggesting that 
among therapists belief in repressed memory is lower and belief in the fallibility of memory, 
particularly when retrieved through hypnosis, is greater today than in the 1990s. No difference was 
observed between clinical psychology researchers and practitioners in the percentage who now 
thought repressed memories could be true or could be false. Although the therapists involved were 
not the same individuals, these data offer welcome reassurance that clinical practitioners have 
generally been responsive to warnings about the dangers of false memories being uncritically 
accepted as true and adapted their practices accordingly. Paradoxically, however, clinicians and 
undergraduates reported high levels of belief in the possibility of repressed memories. Patihis et al. 
assume that repression is an unscientific concept, that there is a scientist-practitioner gap in beliefs, 
and that differences between researchers and practitioners in beliefs about repression mean that 
practitioners are insufficiently educated about memory research. We argue that these conclusions 
are unjustified. 
It has been pointed out many times that throughout the entire corpus of Freud’s writing he 
adopted two quite different meanings of the term ‘repression’, one corresponding to a fully 
unconscious defense and one corresponding to a conscious defensive strategy (Bowers & Farvolden, 
1996; Brewin & Andrews, 1998; Erdelyi, 1990). Whereas attempts to find experimental evidence for 
the unconscious version have been largely unsuccessful (Holmes, 1990), the conscious version of 
‘repression’ corresponds to everyday strategies such as thought avoidance and thought suppression. 
Avoidance of thoughts and memories is accepted as ubiquitous in psychopathology and the ability of 
individuals to deliberately forget unwanted material is well established in laboratory research 
(Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson & Huddleston, 2012; Geiselman, Bjork, & Fishman, 1983). The 
implication is that investigations of beliefs about repression must specify what type of repression is 
meant if answers are to be interpretable. 
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In Patihis et al.’s Study 1 participants were asked to respond to items such as “Traumatic 
memories are often repressed (which means the person cannot remember the traumatic event due 
to a defense against painful content)” and “Repressed memories can be retrieved in therapy 
accurately” on a 6-point Likert scale anchored with ‘Strongly disagree’ to ‘Strongly agree’. In our 
view the high percentage of undergraduates agreeing with these statements to at least a small 
degree is not ‘surprising’, as the authors claim, but reflects the belief that ‘repression’ can, as 
suggested by Freud, be an everyday process.  
Further findings of this study (Table 1) indicated that belief in repressed memories formed a 
factor with other beliefs that, although controversial, do possess some empirical support. For 
example, the belief that “Hypnosis can accurately retrieve memories that previously were not known 
to the person” is consistent with evidence that hypnosis may sometimes lead both to additional 
accurate recall as well as to additional inaccurate recall (British Psychological Society, 2001). The 
belief that “Some people have true ‘photographic memories’” is consistent with evidence for 
exceptional memory abilities in a very small number of individuals (LePort et al., 2012; Wilding & 
Valentine, 1994), and was endorsed by approximately 50% of researchers in Study 2 (supplementary 
Table S2.2). It does not seem unreasonable to agree to some degree with these statements. 
Interestingly, other straightforwardly erroneous beliefs such as “With effort, we can remember 
events back to birth” did not load on this factor, and beliefs in memory fallibility formed a separate 
and orthogonal factor. We are not persuaded that this pattern of responses demonstrates evidence 
for widespread faulty beliefs about memory. 
In Study 2 undergraduates in the 1990s and 2011 endorsed the likely accuracy of a 
recovered memory at approximately the midway point on a 11-point scale (Fig. 3), reflecting the 
overwhelming view of professional bodies and independent commentators that recovered 
memories may be accurate, false, or a mixture of the two (Lindsay & Read, 1995; Wright, Ost, & 
French, 2006). Practitioners endorsed beliefs about traumatic memories being repressed and 
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recovered accurately to a markedly higher degree than researchers but again no clear indication was 
given about whether questions related to the unconscious or deliberate forms of repression. 
Moreover, belief in memory fallibility was again simultaneously high (see Table S2.2). In contrast, 
this table identifies clear differences between clinical psychologist practitioners and alternative 
therapists, with the latter endorsing beliefs about memories going back to birth and the reliability of 
hypnotically-retrieved memories much more strongly. 
In conclusion, we suggest that the paradoxical findings reported by Patihis et al. do not 
identify a gap between clinical psychology researchers and practitioners, but rather a scientifically 
respectable difference in the interpretation of ambiguous terms such as ‘repression’. This is 
consistent with the other evidence that practitioners hold evidence-based beliefs about hypnosis, 
memory fallibility etc. In their turn, researchers need to be aware that memory is highly situation-
dependent (Roediger, 2008), and that assumptions commonly made in laboratory research, for 
example about the integrity and stability of the remembering self, are often not applicable to 
individuals exposed to extreme adversity in early life (Brewin, 2012). What Patihis and colleagues 
have identified, we believe, is a highly significant difference in the beliefs of clinical psychology 
versus alternative practitioners, with the former showing clear evidence of having adapted their 
practice in accordance with changes in the evidence base.  
Further, we believe an excessive focus on beliefs about repression risks hindering scientific 
progress by conflating the phenomenon of interest (the forgetting of traumatic events) with the 
theoretical mechanism responsible. There is abundant evidence in support of the fact that events 
such as traumatic deaths and murder, as well as sexual assaults, can sometimes be forgotten (Belli, 
2012; Brewin, 2003; Pyszora, Barker, & Kopelman, 2003; Pyszora, Fahy, & Kopelman, in press), and 
many candidate mechanisms such as dissociation that have been the focus of cognitive and 
neurobiological research. We would like to see more active consideration of these possibilities. 
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